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The globalization of technology in emerging 
markets: a gravity model on the determinants 
of international patent collaborations 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes international technological collaborations among patents’ inventors 
between emerging and advanced countries. It uses USPTO patents for eleven emerging economies and 
seven advanced countries (1990-2004) and a novel database that exploits information on companies’ 
country of origin. Geographical distance and longitude affect international collaborations only when the 
applicant’s ownership is in the emerging country. Fixed effect estimates show that stronger IPRs 
positively affect international collaborations when stemming from subsidiaries of multinational firms. 
In contrast the effect of IPRs is negative when the applicant’s ownership is in the emerging country. 
Technological proximity and sharing a common language are also important. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Endogenous growth models have shown that commercially-oriented innovation efforts by profit-
seeking firms promote technological progress and productivity growth (Romer, 1990; Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992) and international knowledge spillovers are key drivers of catching up and income 
convergence (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Fagerberg, 1994). Recent empirical literature on 
international knowledge flows has made important progress and identifies different channels of 
knowledge spillovers: import flows, cross-border investments, and a disembodied direct channel of 
codified information. Most of this literature focuses on developed or OECD countries, however the 
literature shows that imports are a significant channel of technology diffusion (e.g. Coe et al.  1997; 
Keller, 2004). Some evidence suggests also that technical knowledge is transmitted through exports. 
Finally foreign direct investments (FDIs) from multinational corporations generate technology 
spillovers (in particular vertical spillovers), through the physical presence of the plant and labor 
turnover (Keller, 2010, Keller and Yeaple, 2009a). In particular, as emphasized by Keller’s survey 
(2010), empirical evidence shows that geography and physical distance importantly shape the diffusion 
of technical knowledge. 
The idea that international knowledge spillovers affect productivity growth enhancing 
technological adoption and innovation in developing countries (Keller, 2010; Montobbio and Sterzi, 
2011) stimulates governments and international organizations to place the domestic dissemination of 
frontier knowledge high up on their policy agenda (e.g. World Bank, 2010). At the same time, recent 
empirical literature has also shown that knowledge spillovers tend to be localized1 and require 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Griffith et al., 2004). This is because technological 
knowledge includes not only materials and knowledge codified in blueprints, manuals, publications and 
patents but also know-how, routines and organizational capabilities, much of which is tacit in nature 
(Dosi, 1988; Cimoli et al., 2009). Tacit knowledge (e.g. related to technical know-how or non-standard 
production) is costly to transfer, and its transferability is limited by its embeddedness in individuals, 
teams and organizations.  
 
 
As a consequence, knowledge diffuses more rapidly when inter-personal links in the form of joint 
research efforts and collaborations create opportunities for learning which go beyond the exchange of 
codified information. In particular, recent evidence underlines that research collaborations create social 
networks which can foster mutual learning and, as a result, individuals and companies that actively 
participate in a network of knowledge exchange (Singh, 2005; Hoekman et al., 2009; Breschi and 
Lissoni, 2009) are more innovative. 
This paper therefore analyses international technological collaborations between patent inventors 
in a "North-South" gravity model looking at the interactions between emerging and advanced countries 
under the assumption that technological collaborations imply face-to-face interactions that are a key 
vehicle of knowledge spillovers. However, while scholars have been widely aware of the nature of 
globalization in terms of trade and financial openness, there is no clear consensus about the extent of 
globalization of technological activities.  
Academics and international organizations acknowledge that R&D activity is increasingly done at 
the international level (OECD, 2008). A number of communications technologies, such as fiber optics, 
social networks, and satellite communications, facilitate international technological activity and, in 
parallel with the decrease in communications and transport costs, geographical distance should have a 
declining impact on technological collaborations and research ventures.  
At the same time, some authors (Granstrand et al., 1992; Patel and Vega, 1999) show that the 
technological activities of the world's largest firms continue to be firmly embedded in their 
headquarters in the home countries. In parallel, Picci (2010), focusing on OECD countries, studies the 
degree of internationalization of innovative activities using patent data and finds a statistically 
significant impact of geographical distance. He shows that even if R&D internationalization is now 
more pronounced than it was 20 years ago there is a “lasting lack of globalization” that is surprising in 
the light of the abundant anecdotal evidence of both increased domestic R&D activities in emerging 
countries and offshoring R&D activities to countries such as China and India. 
 
 
Moreover, the scale and scope of international technological collaborations are affected by the 
legislation on intellectual property rights (IPRs) which has changed rapidly in recent years after 
approval of the TRIPs (Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights) agreement signed in 1994 
and adopted and implemented by different countries at different points in time. One of the main 
economic justifications of the TRIPs agreement is that IPR reinforcement in emerging countries 
facilitates knowledge transfer and dissemination from advanced countries.2 It is relevant then to control 
for the impact of IPR legislation on technology transfer and spillovers brought about by international 
technological collaborations between inventors. 
In addition, the impact of geographical distance and IPR legislation on international technological 
collaborations – and, in turn, on knowledge transmission – depends upon the typology of firms 
involved in the innovative project. It is therefore important to distinguish whether international 
technological collaborations occur with the joint contribution of different companies in different 
countries or within the laboratory of a multinational corporation (MNC) located in an advanced or 
emerging country or, finally, within the laboratory of a company from an emerging country. This paper 
contributes to the literature, building a novel database that takes into account not only the residential 
address of inventors and assignees but also the ownership of companies and their nationality. In parallel, 
the specific composition of the international team of inventors and the relative weight of the different 
countries in the team is also taken into account. For example, if the international team of inventors 
contains a large majority of inventors from an advanced country and the patent is applied for by a 
company with an address in the advanced country, we can expect that the international collaboration is 
the result of a movement of skilled labor from the emerging to the advanced country. This type of 
international collaboration (and its determinants) is clearly different from a collaboration occurring in a 
laboratory of a MNC subsidiary located in the emerging country. 
We use patent data from the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and we collect 
economic and institutional data from different sources. The sample covers 18 countries: a group of 
large emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, China, South Korea, South Africa, Mexico, 
 
 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Turkey) and their relationship with seven advanced countries (USA, UK, 
Japan, Italy, Germany, France and Canada). In order to model the impact of geographical distance and 
the impact of IPR reinforcement on technological collaborations between emerging and advanced 
countries, we use a modified version of a gravity equation and different empirical specifications, using 
panel data and Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) in order to tackle various econometric 
problems. 
Our main results are that geographical distance is not important per se and distance matters mostly 
through trade and cultural similarities. Results are slightly stronger for time zone differences. 
Technological proximity is a very important factor that favors collaboration. Fixed effects models show 
that countries experiencing an increase in IPRs protection tend to be more involved in international 
collaboration. This effect is greater for those countries that have stronger trade relationships, and is 
positive only in the emerging countries characterized by a very low level of IPR legislations before the 
TRIPs agreements. 
Importantly, for a subset of countries, we show that these determinants of international 
technological collaboration vary according to the type of collaboration considered and country of origin 
(emerging vs. advanced) of the companies involved. For example, for collaborations deriving from 
laboratories of multinational subsidiaries, we have no effects of geographical distance and a positive 
effect of IPR reinforcement. On the contrary, for collaborations that involve only a company from the 
emerging market, communication and transport costs – proxied by geographical distance – turn out to 
be important and the effect of the reinforcement of IPRs is negative.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present recent evidence on the geography of 
knowledge spillovers and discuss to what extent co-inventor relationships can be considered an 
indicator of knowledge flows. In Section 3 we present our model of weightless gravity used to study the 
determinants of international technological collaborations between emerging and advanced countries. 
In Section 4 we present data and the empirical model. Section 5 discusses the results of the 
econometric analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 2. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL COLLABORATIONS AS SOURCE OF 
KNOWLEDGE FLOWS. 
Technological diffusion is a major vehicle of technological change that in turn contributes 
importantly to productivity and economic growth. In particular the analysis of international 
technological diffusion is key to understand whether less-developed countries are able to catch up. 
Endogenous growth models typically consider technology as non-rival and underline that technological 
investments have both private and public returns.  As a consequence technological activity creates 
external or spillover effects. However these external effects are not automatic as they require domestic 
investments in technology absorption (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).   
 
2(a) Diffusion of technology and tacit knowledge 
In recent years substantial research effort has analyzed international technological diffusion 
(Keller, 2004; Keller, 2010).  Keller (2004 and 2010) emphasizes that there are at least three important 
channels: international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and R&D. Recent evidence suggests that 
importing is associated with technology spillover. In addition there can be FDIs spillovers associated 
with physical presence of affiliate plants and mobility of human capital. Finally R&D spillovers depend 
upon the ability of countries of learning and adopting foreign technologies. For example substantial 
international knowledge spillovers are found by Griffith et al. (2004) who also show that technological 
learning requires absorptive capacity. 
Keller (2004 and 2010) emphasizes also that international technological diffusion is shaped by 
geography. International trade is importantly affected by geographical distance because the diffusion of 
technology embedded in intermediate goods is affected by trade costs. Secondly it is also costly to 
communicate knowledge that is not incorporated in intermediate or capital goods (see footnote 1).  
  The main reason is that important pieces of knowledge are tacit and that learning is the product 
of experience (Polany, 1958). The transfer of knowledge is not automatic even when patents, 
 
 
publications and blueprints are freely available. Using Arrow’s words (1962, p. 155): “Learning can only 
take place through the attempt to solve a problem and therefore only takes place during activity”. In 
this respect many authors – including Keller (2010) and Keller and Yeaple (2009b) – have placed 
emphasis on the advantages provided by face-to-face interactions over other forms of communication 
like telephone calls or e-mails. Face-to-face interaction is a superior vehicle of knowledge 
communication because it is possible to have instantaneous feedback and direct correction of wrong 
interpretation. 
Moreover, when people communicate face to face they convey information not only through 
words but also using body language, facial expression, and tone of voice that are tailored specifically to 
the receivers (Koskinen and Vanharanta, 2002). In sum, knowledge exchange is particularly fruitful 
when it is linked to specific problem-solving activities and when it takes place through face-to-face 
interactions. In addition, tacit knowledge is often linked to specific individuals and, typically, requires 
active participation in a specific network of knowledge exchange. This has been widely recognized in 
sociology of science (e.g. MacKenzie and Spinardi, 1995).  Because tacit knowledge is transmitted 
person to person, there are great barriers to the diffusion of knowledge and in addition key scientific 
developments take often place within a restricted number of researchers rather than in the wider 
scientific community. 
 
2(b) Technological collaborations and knowledge exchanges 
When inventors and scientists collaborate they exchange knowledge. The characteristics and the 
density of the community of inventors and the networks arising among them play therefore a relevant 
role in the innovative process. Research collaborations create social networks which can foster mutual 
learning. Actually, joint research efforts and collaborations create opportunities for learning which go 
beyond the exchange of formalized and codified information and knowledge. Participation or exclusion 
from given research networks not only affects the innovative performance of the country, the region, 
 
 
the firm or the individual in question, but also affects the set of possibilities for learning routines and 
practices. 
Some papers have analyzed knowledge diffusion across regions through collaborations, mainly in 
the European context. The first group of papers studies R&D collaborations between firms, 
universities and public research centers using data from the EU Framework Programmes3. A second 
group of papers analyses research collaborations using publication data in different European 
organizations. EU organizations tend to collaborate with physically proximate partners (Hoekman et al. 
2009). At the same the effect of national borders seem to decrease over time in parallel with the process 
of European integration (Hoekman et al. 2010)4. Scherngell and Hu (2011) study research collaboration 
between Chinese regions and find a strong effect of technological proximity together with a weaker 
effect of physical distance. 
Other papers have used patents and patent citations data to analyze inventors’ networks and 
knowledge diffusion. Singh (2005) analyzes if and how interpersonal networks determine knowledge 
diffusion patterns in terms of geographic localization and intra-firm transfers using USPTO data since 
1975.  He explores direct and indirect network ties between inventors, using past co-signed patents and 
finds that the social links between inventors are associated with a greater probability of knowledge flow 
(measured by patent citations), with the probability decreasing as the social ‘distance’ between inventors 
increases. Breschi and Lissoni (2001, 2009) show that inventors’ mobility and the co-invention network 
are crucial determinants of knowledge diffusion. 
This paper studies international technological collaborations between inventors as listed in patent 
data at country level. Each patent represents the output of an inventive project and co-inventorship can 
be used as a proxy of knowledge flows generated by interpersonal and social links deriving from the 
collaboration in the inventive project. In particular, co-inventorship can be used to track the transfer of 
non-codified knowledge (e.g. technical know-how, non-standardized production procedures etc.) 
which, at least periodically, requires face-to-face interactions which have a positive impact on 
technological learning and, finally, make technology transfer more effective.  
 
 
However the claim that international patent collaborations measure knowledge flows has to be 
qualified. Actually international co-operations may be the results of different types of activities and 
therefore they measure different types of knowledge flows. In particular inventors may be listed in 
patent data because of activities that are different from R&D projects or for reasons that depend on 
specific features of the patent systems. Bergek and Bruzelius (2010) study ABB, a Swiss-Swedish 
multinational and have interviewed Swedish inventors of 53 ABB international patents. They find that 
60% of the patents considered are really the result of international collaborations, that half of them are 
the result of international R&D activities and only one third are joint R&D projects. Activities different 
from R&D include maintenance, service or helping out the patent application procedures. Most of the 
remaining 40% are the result of inventor movements. This is another form of knowledge flow that we 
discuss at length in the empirical part of the paper. 
 
2(c) International technological collaborations and emerging countries. 
This paper examines collaboration between emerging and advanced countries. If knowledge 
spillovers are important for advanced countries where most of the technological activity takes place, 
they are even more relevant for emerging and developing countries where many new technical advances 
are either not available or not adopted. If technological collaborations are effective channels of 
knowledge spillovers, they can also be considered an important element in catching up processes. The 
fact that technological knowledge cannot be considered a pure public good has important implications 
for the growth path and for economic convergence because it limits the geographical reach of 
knowledge spillovers.  
As an example, Montobbio and Sterzi (2011), based on data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico, estimate that international knowledge spillovers from the G-5 countries are a 
significant determinant of inventive activity during the period 1988-2003. Moreover, they find that 
controlling for US-driven R&D effects, bilateral patent citations and face-to-face relationships between 
inventors are both important additional mechanisms of knowledge transmission.  
 
 
To a great extent, inadequate access to the informal or practical knowledge network that 
integrates the codified portion of technical change5 could generate a slower pace of new technology 
adoption. In this vein, this paper provides a first attempt to estimate the determinants of international 
technological collaborations in emerging countries using a gravity model. 
 
3. THE WEIGHTLESS GRAVITY OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL 
COLLABORATIONS 
The empirical evidence discussed in the previous section shows that seemingly weightless 
technological knowledge could follow the law of gravity. Only a few papers address the issue of 
technological collaborations in a gravity context and are mainly focused on developed or OECD 
countries. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) study different patent-based indexes of 
technological internationalization of the OECD countries and show that small and low tech countries 
are more open. They also find that technological collaboration depends upon technological proximity 
and the presence of both a common language and a common border. 
Maggioni et al. (2007) study collaborations among inventors in EPO patents between 109 
European regions from 1998 to 2002 and find a strong effect of geographical and technological 
distance. Picci (2010) studies international collaboration using co-inventors and co-applicants of a set of 
patent applications at the European national patent offices and at the EPO and studies the increased 
level of technological collaborations of the European countries. He finds that distance, common 
language and common borders explain a substantial part of the variation in bilateral collaborations.  
Our main assumption is that firms incur costs to communicate and exchange knowledge 
because a substantial part of it is tacit and requires face-to-face contacts. These costs depend upon 
transport and communication costs that arise from geographical distance. In addition, if the knowledge 
is sophisticated and the content technically complex, the tacit component is particularly important and 
therefore we can expect higher communication costs. However, if the marginal benefit of the 
technological collaboration is higher, companies will be prepared to incur higher costs and in principle 
 
 
to collaborate with companies that are geographically further away. To address this issue, we model 
technological collaborations in a gravity framework where international knowledge flows between 
inventors in two different countries are assumed to depend upon a constant, a set of country specific 
attractors, geographical and technological distance between the two countries, a set of link variables and 
a set of policy variables. 
 
3(a) Dependent variable 
We observe international technological collaborations between an emerging country (i) and an 
advanced country (j) at the individual inventor level. We identify a technological collaboration when a 
patent is co-signed by at least one inventor resident in country i and at least one inventor resident in 
country j.6 Note that, differently from gravity models in the trade literature, our dependent variable is a 
non-directed measure of international technological collaborations. However, we assume that the main 
knowledge flow is from G7 to emerging countries because patentable knowledge is mainly produced in 
the G7 countries and collaborations with emerging countries represent a negligible share of the total 
number of international collaborations of G7 countries. This is especially true whenever multinational 
companies seek new market opportunities in emerging countries, by locating their R&D facilities close 
to costumers, or when they are attracted by lower costs of R&D. However it is also possible that the 
multinational R&D location is driven by the access to high qualified R&D personnel in the emerging 
economy (Thursby and Thursby, 2006). In such case the exchange of knowledge takes place in both 
directions7. 
We look at the inventor level because we assume that knowledge spillovers pass through 
interpersonal links and, therefore, it is at the individual level that the real knowledge exchange takes 
place8. At the same time, the assignees’ address and country of origin convey important pieces of 
information. In terms of knowledge spillovers, it makes a difference whether the assignee is from an 
emerging country (possibly a multinational subsidiary or a local company) or from an advanced 
 
 
country9. Accordingly, starting from the definition of collaborative patent given above, we observe three 
different possibilities:  
 (1) at least one of the assignees’ addresses listed in the patent is a company located in the 
emerging country (i.e. at least one of the applicants is either a local company or the MNC subsidiary of 
a G7 country); (2) the assignee’s address is in the advanced country (the applicant is either a foreign 
company or a MNC subsidiary which does not declare the R&D foreign laboratory in the patent); (3) 
the patent is co-owned by individuals from different countries (assignees of the patents are the 
inventors). 
In case (1), taking the perspective of the emerging country, it is important to identify the 
country of origin of the assignee and distinguish whether the assignee is a local company (or institution) 
or a local subsidiary of a MNC. The composition of the international team of inventors in the patent 
can be generated either by a local company hiring a foreign inventor or by a MNC subsidiary working 
with both local and foreign inventors (presumably coming from the MNC’s home country). In the 
former case, knowledge is transferred using a foreign skilled worker. In the latter, knowledge is 
transferred through the movement of R&D facilities from advanced countries (Keller and Yeaple, 
2009b). 
It is important to note that when looking at the assignee’s address it is not possible to 
distinguish between a domestic organization (DC) and a multinational subsidiary (MNC); as a 
consequence, we have built a novel database in which, looking one by one at the assignees’ names, we 
single out their country of origin. Considering all the assignees with an address in the emerging country 
i we call them domestic (DC), if the owner is from country i and multinational (MNC) if the owner is from 
an advanced country. More generally in our terminology, we take the perspective of the emerging 
countries and also collaborations are called domestic when the assignee’s ownership is from the emerging 
country and foreign when the applicant firm’s ownership is from the advanced country. 
In case (2) when the assignee’s address is in the advanced country, the presence of an 
international team of inventors is explained by two different possibilities: the first one is that there is 
 
 
temporary movement of an inventor from the emerging to the advanced country, that is an inventor 
from country i decides to move to advanced country j but still declares that her address is in the 
emerging country i and therefore maintains strong links with the home country10. The second 
possibility is that a MNC has a subsidiary in the emerging country but uses the legal address of the 
headquarters even if the patent is the result of a research activity that takes place in a foreign laboratory. 
To identify whether this collaboration originates in a multinational’s R&D laboratory located in the 
emerging country or in R&D laboratories of firms located in advanced countries, we decide to look at 
the team of inventors and at their residential address. The idea is that if a patent is invented by the 
majority of individuals residing in country i we assume that the R&D laboratory is located in country i 
as well. In this vein, among collaborative patents whose applicant’s address is in one of the G7 
countries, we consider as MNC collaborative patents (i.e. a collaboration originating in the emerging 
country and owned by multinationals of advanced countries) those invented by teams where the 
number of inventors residing in one of the selected emerging countries is equal to or more than 50% of 
the total number of inventors in the team. Imposing these constraints reassures us that our dependent 
variable is measuring an international technological cooperation which occurs in the emerging country. 
Whenever the percentage of domestic inventors is lower than 50%, we consider those patents to 
originate in foreign companies located in the advanced country (FC). 
Finally, in case (3), when the collaborative patent is co-owned by individuals from different 
countries it can safely be considered that an international exchange of knowledge has occurred, even 
though we are not able to assess whether it has originated in the emerging or in the advanced country.  
In sum, collaborations may derive either from R&D laboratories located in emerging countries 
– and in such cases we distinguish between patents owned by domestic companies (DC) and 
multinational subsidiaries (MNC) – or from R&D laboratories located in advanced countries (FC), or 
from patents applied by individuals residing in different countries (I). Table 1 sums up the different 
types of collaborations considered.  
 
 
 
[TABLE 1 NEAR HERE] 
 
It is relevant to stress that all cases concern to some extent the transfer of knowledge from the 
advanced to the emerging country, and we start the analysis using as a dependent variable simply the 
number of all technological collaborations (xijt) in a given year between two countries (i and j) (Section 
5(a)). We also argue that the different types of international collaboration outlined above may be 
explained by different determinants and therefore we decompose our dependent variable following the 
taxonomy in Table 1 (Section 5(c)). We estimate the impact of geographical distance and other 
determinants on the expected value of xijt using a standard gravity model11 represented by the following 
equation12: 
 
E[xijt]= A
α
itA
β
jtD
θ
ijexp(λLij+ δTijt) Mijt
νIPRγite
τt           (1) 
 
3(b) Distances 
Dij is the geographical distance between the emerging (i) and the advanced country (j), θ is the 
“distance effect”, that is, the (negative) elasticity of international technological collaborations with 
respect to geographical distance. We consider three different measures of geographical distance: 
Distanceij uses latitude and longitude of the most populated cities; Distance(capital)ij the latitude and 
longitude of capital cities; and Distance(weighted)ij is a weighted (by the share of country population) 
measure of the distances of the most populated cities13. 
Some scholars have also argued that it is important to distinguish between latitude and 
longitude (Stein and Daude, 2007). Simple distance does not capture the transaction costs of frequent 
interactions in real time between the parties: “provided that telephone, e-mail and videoconference 
communication are close substitutes for face-to-face interaction, North-South distance should not be 
such a large problem. In contrast, differences in time zones can matter even given today’s easy and low-
cost communications, for the obvious reason that people at night usually prefer to sleep” (Stein and 
 
 
Daude 2007, p. 97). So geographic distance can be considered a proxy of face-to-face interaction cost 
and time zone difference a proxy of virtual interaction cost that can substitute direct personal contacts.  
The variable TimeZoneDifferenceij measures the time difference in hours between the capital cities of 
countries i and j. This variable ranges from 0 to 12.  
Moreover, other distances related to cultural and historical differences are taken into account: 
these variables usually refer to common language or past colonial links. Accordingly, Lij is a vector of 
time-constant ‘link’ indicators that may affect both technological collaboration and knowledge flow. These 
dummies indicate whether county i and country j share a common official language (Languageij) and 
whether they have had a colonial relationship since 1945 (Colonyij).  
We also consider technological distance. The probability to observe a technological 
collaboration between two countries is higher if companies and institutions in the two countries are 
active in a similar set of technological fields. Technological distance can also be result of the different 
level of development of the manufacturing sector in the emerging countries. Accordingly, Tijt is the 
technological proximity between countries i and j and is measured by the un-centered correlation of the two 
countries’ vectors of patents across 30 technological classes (OST, 2004) at time t (Pit and Pjt), as 
follows: TPijt=PitP’jt/[(PitP’it)(PjtP’jt)]1/2. This indicator typically ranges between 0 and 1 for all pairs of 
countries. It is equal to one for the pairs of countries with identical distribution of technological 
activities; it is equal to zero if the distributions are orthogonal (Jaffe, 1988).  
 
3(c) Attractors 
Aαit and A
β
jt measure specific characteristics of countries i and j, in particular the number of 
patents and the size of the labor force. In our gravity framework we assume that the probability to 
collaborate between two countries depends upon the size of their innovative activities and the size of 
the economy. Therefore, we substitute the masses of the law of gravity with the total number of patent 
applications and labor force (Patentsit, Patentsjt, LaborForceit, and LaborForcejt respectively for country i and 
 
 
country j, at time t). These indicators control for the absorptive capacity of the countries and their 
technological infrastructure and dimension. 
More innovative and larger countries (LaborForceit) are expected to collaborate more. The greater 
the population, the higher the probability that foreign companies cooperate (demand effect). In addition if 
demand is large in an emerging economy, foreign firms (including MNCs) could be willing to adapt 
their technologies to that given market. This could lead them to collaborate with domestic inventors. 
Finally, a larger domestic demand may decrease the geographic distance impact on collaborations 
because the costs related to face-to-face communication decrease (i.e. airfare is cheaper). However, 
from the emerging country point of view, the dimension in terms of labor force (LaborForceit) may have 
counter-intuitive effects: the greater the population, the lesser the probability that local companies seek 
expertise and highly-skilled workers abroad (supply effect). 
There are other reasons that can affect the probability for collaboration at a technological level 
between two countries (vector Mijt in Equation 1). Mijt is made up of Tradeijt which is the value of 
country i imports14 from country j at time t, and FDIit which is the total inflow of foreign direct 
investments (FDIit) into country i at time t.15 
 
3(d) IPR Policy 
Finally, we control for IPR policy in the emerging country. In recent years, emerging countries 
have significantly expanded the strength of their IPR legislations to comply with TRIPS requirements16. 
The adoption of TRIPS and the consequent increase in IP protection could affect co-inventorship and, 
as a result, bilateral knowledge flows. Stronger IPRs in emerging countries should increase their 
economic openness via FDIs, imports and joint ventures and, in turn, technological collaborations. 
New harmonized legislation and stricter enforcement generate greater incentives to disclose 
technological knowledge, especially when technological spillovers are linked to the imports of goods 
because the strengthening of IP reduces the imitation risk and favors the export mode (Helpman, 1993; 
Glass and Saggi, 2002).  
 
 
In principle, the strength of IPRs in an emerging country should reassure multinational 
companies willing to invest and develop technologies in these countries. In particular, Branstetter et al. 
(2006) study how IPR reforms affect technology transfer among U.S. multinational firms. Their firm-
level data show that in 12 countries after IPR reforms there is a growth of royalty payments to affiliates, 
affiliate R&D expenditures and total levels of foreign patent applications. Moreover, we can expect the 
positive effect of IPR reinforcement on international technological collaboration to be stronger when 
companies already have the opportunity to know the emerging market. This is facilitated for those 
emerging countries that are closer in terms of GDP and GDP per capita to the G7 countries or that 
have substantial trade relationships with advanced countries (Qian, 2007). 
On the other side, strong IPRs generate a monopoly power, limiting competition and the 
possibility of cooperation among firms. As a consequence, stronger IPRs and stricter enforcement may 
generate less international knowledge flows through imitation and adoption and the closing down of 
infringing activities17. Finally, worries have also been expressed that stronger IPRs generate higher costs 
of access to imported technologies and difficulties in accessing basic scientific knowledge (Mazzoleni 
and Nelson, 1998; McCalman, 2001).  
We measure the general strength of the domestic intellectual property system (IPRit) using the 
Ginarte and Park index (Ginarte and Park, 1997; Park and Wagh, 2002; Park, 2008)18. This index ranges 
from zero to five and its value is the un-weighted sum of five sub-indexes that range from 0 to 1: (1) 
extent of coverage (subject matter and types of invention); (2) membership of international treaties; (3) 
duration of protection; (4) absence of restrictions on rights (e.g. degree of exclusivity); and finally, (5) 
statutory enforcement provisions (e.g. preliminary injunctions).19 Table 2 shows the IPR index in the 
eleven emerging countries for available years. 
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
4(a) Data description 
Our database starts from the 26 countries included in the MSCI Emerging Market Index20. We 
collected all the patent applications21 at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) signed by at 
least one inventor from all these countries during the period 1990-2004 and we took out European 
transition economies and those countries with less than 50 USPTO patent applications at the beginning 
of our sample between 1990 and 1995. We were then left with the following 11 emerging economies: 
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Israel, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, Singapore, and 
Turkey. The advanced countries are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. In addition, we also collected information on bilateral imports (source: 
STAN/OECD database), FDIs (UNCTAD), geographical and cultural distance (CEPII), and the IPR 
index (Park, 2008). Table A1 in the Appendix describes data sources and gives descriptive statistics. 
The patent dataset contains 119,309 patent applications with at least one inventor residing in 
one of the selected emerging economies, of which 14,684 (12%) identify international collaborations 
between inventors in emerging and advanced countries22. Table 2 shows high heterogeneity among 
emerging countries in terms of patenting activity. South Korea and Israel are leading countries (in terms 
of number of patents) with 70,467 and 18,447 patent applications respectively during the period 1990-
2004, while Argentina and Turkey have only 928 and 392 patent applications respectively. In terms of 
patenting intensity, China and India are ranked last with around 13 and 17 patent applications 
respectively per millions of workers. Countries characterized by a high level of patent productivity are 
also those with a higher level of IP regime at the beginning of the 1990s (see Column (e)).  
 
[TABLE 2 NEAR HERE] 
 
In seven countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, Mexico, and Singapore) the share 
of international collaborations in the total number of patents is around 30%. Nevertheless high 
heterogeneity appears when considering South Korea with just 3% of collaborative patents compared 
 
 
to Turkey with 64%. 
Table 2 also shows that emerging countries have reinforced their regimes of intellectual 
property, due to the TRIPS agreement signed in 1994. Columns (e) and (f) display the value of the 
Ginarte and Park index for two sub-periods. The index grows particularly in countries such as Turkey, 
India and Mexico, whose IPR index was very low at the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, standard 
deviation shows that, as a consequence of the TRIPS agreement, differences in terms of IPR protection 
decreased over time. 
In terms of knowledge spillovers, as discussed in Section 3(a), it can make a difference whether 
the assignee is a multinational subsidiary located in the emerging country, a local company or a foreign 
company. In order to assign the country of origin of the assignee (in terms of ownership) we look one 
by one at all the assignee declaring their address in one of the emerging countries, with the exception of 
Korea and Israel23. This allows us to disentangle the international technological collaborations into four 
different categories according to different types patent applicants’ ownership (see Table 1): 
collaborations derive either from R&D laboratories located in emerging countries – and in such cases 
we distinguish between patents owned by domestic organizations (DC) and multinational subsidiaries 
(MNC) – or from R&D laboratories located in advanced countries (FC), or from patent applications by 
individuals residing in different countries (I).  
Table 3 shows how frequently each particular collaboration category occurs in the data. 
Collaborations involving companies located in one of the G7 countries (FC) are the most frequent in 
all the cases: they range from 82% for Brazil to 45% for Singapore. This basically means that a 
consistent part of knowledge exchange between advanced and emerging economies occurs abroad, 
possibly via the international labor mobility of skilled people. On the other hand, Singapore and South 
Africa have the highest share of collaborations which originate from own R&D laboratories, as they are 
the countries (not considering Israel and Korea) with the highest patent intensity. 
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4(b) Model and econometric issues 
The gravity model in Equation 1 can be estimated using different econometric techniques. 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that a log linear model provides biased estimates of mean 
effects when the errors are heteroschedastic. To address this problem they recommend a Poisson 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator as a tractable and robust alternative24.  
Moreover, the number of technological cooperations between two countries in some years is 
zero. However, zeros are not the results of the rounding up errors that can be typically found in trade 
data and the PPML estimator solves this problem as it is “a natural way to deal with the zero values of the 
dependent variable” (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, p. 641). In addition, in our case the problem is not 
as relevant as in the trade gravity equations because the share of zeros is less than 30%, while for 
example the same share in datasets involving disaggregate trade flows is frequently much higher (e.g. 
Baldwin and Harrigan, 2007; Helpman et al., 2008). 
Finally, this estimator is also particularly suitable because our dependent variable is a count and 
its distribution is highly skewed. So, as suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), we started 
estimating the model using PPML with the classical Huber and White sandwich estimator of variance 
(Huber, 1967, White, 1980). Moreover, because observations in pairs of countries are likely to be 
dependent across years, robust standard errors are clustered to control for error correlation in the panel 
(Cameron and Golotvina, 2005). 
 
5. RESULTS 
In what follows we present three sets of regressions. In the first set we consider different 
specifications to estimate distance effects. We use panel data with source and destination country 
dummies and interact time dummies to control whether the estimated collaboration elasticity to 
distance changes over time. However, there is the possibility that country i would exchange different 
 
 
levels of knowledge with two different countries even though the two countries have the same level of 
LaborForcei and Patentsi and of the other control variables, being at the same time equidistant from 
country i. One possible reason could be that they share similar historical, cultural or political factors 
that are difficult to observe and are only partly addressed by our control variables. 
Accordingly in the second set of regressions, we control for unobservable time invariant 
individual effects where the individual is the specific bilateral relation between countries i and j. In so 
doing, the fixed effect analysis shifts the focus onto the impact of time variant variables like 
technological proximity, trade and IPRs.  
Finally, in the third set of regressions we disentangle international technological collaborations 
by identifying where (in emerging or advanced country) they take place and the applicants’ ownership 
(domestic, MNCs or individuals), as described in Section 3(a). We argue that international technological 
collaborations can be the result of decisions by individuals to move abroad or by MNCs to 
internationalize their R&D activities and to cooperate with a foreign knowledge base. These decisions 
are subject to different explanatory factors.  
 
5(a) The effect of geographical, cultural and technological distances 
Table 4 reports the estimates of the distance elasticity of international technological 
collaborations for different specifications25. All regressions contain a full set of time dummies that are 
used to control for time varying unobservable factors that are common across countries. Country 
dummies (both for country i and j) control for differences between countries – such as macroeconomic 
stability, particularly government policies, human capital and other non-observable factors – that might 
affect the number of collaborations.  
In column (1) we estimate a non-augmented gravity model by considering distance and mass; 
we find that both have significant explanatory power. In particular, our gravity model is asymmetric 
because the masses measured by patenting activity have a positive and significant effect only in the case 
of patent applications by emerging countries (Patentsit) and not for patent applications from advanced 
 
 
countries (Patentsjt)26. LaborForceit in the emerging country is negative and significant. This may suggest 
that smaller countries seek expertise and highly-skilled workers abroad to compensate for the shortage 
in the local market.  
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 Column (1) suggests that Distanceij is significantly negative and that therefore communication 
and transportation costs might play a significant role in determining the geographical scope of 
technological collaborations. However, what we observe in column (1) is both the direct and the indirect 
effect (through trade) of distance on collaborations. According to trade literature in fact distance 
significantly affects trade flows and so, by omitting trade in the model, we capture both effects. 
However, Poisson results also show that the estimated distance elasticity is no more significant once we 
use a broader set of variables in columns (2) to (4). In particular, controlling for trade cancels out the 
effects of geographical distance. In columns (2)-(4) we estimate the direct effect and Poisson results 
show that controlling for trade (and other broader set of variables) geographical distance is no more 
significant. Moreover, in columns (2)-(4) different measures for geographical distances are considered, 
but in all the cases they are not significant (even though negative as expected). Our first result therefore 
is that the impact of geographical distance per se on international technological collaboration is hardly 
relevant. However it is important to note that distance still plays a role on international collaborations 
through bilateral imports as we find a distance elasticity with respect to trade of about -0.84.  
Other forms of distance like similarity in the technological distribution of the inventive activity 
and language similarity have a positive effect still controlling for trade relationship. In addition, using 
the specification in column (2), we have interacted time dummies with distance to estimate the effect of 
distance in different calendar years. Figure 1 shows that its magnitude does not decrease over time. 
 
 
 
[FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE] 
 
As a general result, therefore, geographical distance does not significantly matter once 
controlling for trade and, at the same time, there is no trend towards a reduction of the impact of 
distance over the years because, if any, the distance elasticity of international technological 
collaborations increases over time. This result is also in line with the ‘‘missing globalization puzzle’’ (e.g. 
Brun et al., 2005) in the gravity model of bilateral trade.  
As discussed in Section 3(b), Stein and Duade (2007) find that differences in time zones have a 
negative and significant effect on the location of FDI and, to a lesser extent, on trade. Moreover, they 
find that the longitudinal effect has increased over time. In Columns (5) and (6) we show two 
regressions in which the TimeZoneDifferenceij variable is added: our results, in line with their findings for 
trade, show that its coefficient is negative and significant. In particular, an additional hour is associated 
with a 7% decrease in the number of patent collaborations (column (5)). Moreover TimeZoneDifferenceij  is 
still negative and significant when controlling for geographical distance (column (6)). 
Cultural and historical ties, respectively, are captured by dummies which are equal to one if two 
countries share a common official language (Languageij) and the two countries have ever had a colonial 
link (Colonyij). Our results confirm the hypothesis as corroborated in Picci (2010): sharing a common 
language facilitates collaborations. Also, the colonial relationship variable is positively correlated with 
international technological collaborations even though this effect is not statistically different from 
zero27. 
We observe a positive, large and statistically significant coefficient for technological proximity 
(TechnlogyProximityijt)28. The effect of technological proximity is much larger than trade (bilateral 
imports). Countries which share similar technological composition have more chances to collaborate. 
The quantitative significance of the estimated impact of technological proximity is substantial: for a 
standard deviation increase in the technological proximity (which is equal to 0.14, see Table A1 the 
 
 
Appendix), the mean number of expected collaborations between country i and country j increases by a 
factor of 1.23 (or 23.4%), holding other variables constant. 
Concerning Trade, we always find a positive estimated coefficient that is not statistically 
different from zero. In principle, the probability of observing a technological collaboration is higher 
between trading partners but this effect, if it exists, is weak. The total amount of FDIs received is 
negatively but not significantly correlated with collaborations. Note however that this measure, 
differently from trade, is not bilateral (but when we use bilateral FDIs on a subset of countries29 we 
obtain similar results) and that many FDIs do not occur in high tech sectors and therefore it is plausible 
that there is no correlation with technological collaborations. 
Finally, IPRs do not affect the level of technological collaboration between countries. However, 
we suspect that the lack of significance of the coefficient is mainly due to the heterogeneity of countries 
and the effect of IPRs may vary according to the intensity of economic relationship between two 
countries and according to the level of GDP per capita. We explore this issue more in depth in the next 
section. 
 
5(b) The effect of IPRs 
Simple Poisson models presented in Table 4 show a non-significant role of IPRs on 
international patent collaborations. However, in order to better understand the role of IPR 
strengthening, we use a fixed effects (FE) Poisson ML estimator which, with a dummy for each pair of 
countries, captures all the observable and non-observable factors which characterize the country-pairs 
and may have an impact on the propensity to collaborate (Westerlund and Wilhelmsson, 2009). 
Column (1) in Table 5 displays the Poisson estimates for the FE case, which basically is the analogous 
of Column (2) in Table 4 but with 76 individual pair-dummies (11 emerging countries by seven 
advanced countries, with the exclusion of one dummy)30. 
The FE model shows that the IPR effect is positive and significant. It means that, overall, 
countries experiencing an increase in the IP index tend to be more involved in the international 
 
 
network of collaborations31. Moreover, looking at level of protection in 1990, we note that six countries 
show an index higher than 1.50: South Africa, South Korea, Malaysia, Israel, Singapore, and Argentina. 
The other five countries show an index lower than 1.50: Brazil, India, China, Mexico and Turkey. The 
latter group includes countries among the highest in terms of IPR index growth (see Table 2).  
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It is important to note that we find that a stronger level of IPRs has a positive effect only for 
this latter group of countries (see column (2)). In addition, the effect of IPRs is negative for those 
countries that at the beginning of the period had a relatively higher level of IPR protection (column 
(3)). This suggests that the relationship between patent collaborations and the strength of intellectual 
property rights may be different according to the different levels of intellectual property protection in 
different countries. This result is in line with other evidence on the non-linear relations between 
innovation and IPRs (e.g. Qian, 2007). Altogether, these results may suggest that the strengthening of 
IPRs could facilitate technological collaborations only if a country starts from a very weak level of IPR 
protection.  However, a further reinforcement beyond a certain threshold could have a negative effect 
leading to monopoly power and higher cost of access to imported technologies. 
We study whether the impact of IPRs varies with different levels of trade or per capita GDP. 
According to some authors (Lapan and Bardhan, 1973; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) knowledge flows 
between countries are greater when emerging countries are characterized by high levels of absorptive 
capacity, which are highly correlated with the per capita GDP. However, our results indicate the 
opposite: stronger IPRs have a negative effect on the intensity of international collaborations for high 
levels of per capita GDP. The interaction term of IPRs and per capita GDP is negative and statistically 
significant (see column (4)). This effect is similar to that outlined in column (3). Countries with a higher 
GDP per capita are those that for the whole period already have a high level of IPR protection. As a 
 
 
consequence, further reinforcement does not have a positive effect on international technological 
collaborations32. 
Finally, we observe a positive sign of the interaction term between IPRs and Trade. The effect 
is positive and significant (only at 90% level). Stronger IPRs in the emerging countries stimulate 
international technological collaborations between countries that also have increasing trade 
relationships. Following this view, the strengthening of IPR facilitates the creation of international 
technological collaborations to the extent that it is supported by the market for goods. 
Note that multicollinearity could increase the standard errors of the estimated coefficients in the 
case of IPRs, Trade and FDIs33. In the correlation table in the Appendix we show that the correlation 
between Trade and IPRs is only 0.17. The problem is a little stronger for FDIs where the correlation is 
0.28. A possible concern regards also the fact that IPR decisions could be endogenous to the extent 
that they could be explained by previous patenting and collaborating strategies of multinational 
companies. However, in the period under scrutiny in the paper (1990-2004) emerging and developing 
countries expanded significantly the strength of their IPR legislations to comply with TRIPS 
requirement. By requiring that WTO member nations enact and enforce laws on copyrights and patents 
to protect intellectual property, the TRIPS agreement could be partially seen as exogenous policy 
changes. 
 
5(c) Companies’ country of origin and patent collaborations 
In Section 3(a) we built up a taxonomy of international technological collaborations based on 
the country of origin and country of residence of the assignees. In our terminology we take the 
perspective of the emerging countries and collaborations are called domestic when the assignee’s 
ownership is from the emerging country and foreign when the assignee’s ownership is from the advanced 
country. International patent collaborations derive from R&D laboratories of either multinational 
subsidiaries located in the emerging country (MNCs) or foreign companies located in one of the 
advanced countries (FCs) or domestic organizations in the emerging country (DCs) or, finally, from 
 
 
patents applied for by individuals residing in different countries (I) (see Table 1). In Section 3(a) we 
have explained why this taxonomy implies different types of collaboration. 
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Table 6 and Table 7 shows Poisson estimates (with and without pairs fixed effects) for these 
different types of collaborations (see Table 1). The coefficient for geographical distance is always 
negative but not significant, confirming the results displayed in Table 4 with one important exception. 
Geographical distance becomes negative and significant when we consider the domestic collaborations 
(DCs_xijt): communication and transport costs are relevant when the collaborative project is owned by a 
company from an emerging country. This is probably because they often have tighter financial 
constraints or higher marginal communication costs due to a lower integration in the international 
network of knowledge production. In this case companies manage to access knowledge that is 
physically closer because it is more costly to communicate and exchange knowledge that is tacit and 
requires face-to-face contacts. The same argument is valid also for collaboration between individuals. 
The value of the estimated is particularly high even of not statistically significant. Interestingly when we 
add time zones to the regressions we find that longitude is important for the same two types of 
collaborations: DCs_xijt and Is_xijt. 
International patent collaborations are less affected by communication and interaction costs 
(face-to-face or virtual) when they derive from R&D laboratories of either multinational subsidiaries 
located in the emerging country (MNCs) or foreign companies located in one of the advanced countries 
(FCs). 
Sharing a common language is an important driver of international technological collaborations 
when these involve a mobility decision at the individual level: the presence of common language 
 
 
(Languageij) is positively associated only with FCs_xij collaborations, that is for collaborations involving 
the mobility of individuals of emerging country to advanced country, and with DCs_xijt collaborations, 
where the mobility of individuals is in the opposite direction. On the other hand, having a colonial link 
(Colonialij) is positively correlated with the number of collaborations stemming from MNC subsidiaries.  
It is important to note that the importance of sharing a common language might not be related 
just to the mobility decision at the individual level but to the cost of searching for partners. MNCs are 
expected to be indifferent to language as they are searching within the boundaries of the group and they 
are all likely to speak English. This possibly does not occur in the case for FCs and DCs collaborations. 
In this case probably inventors are looking for partners outside their companies. 
The effect of technological proximity (TechnlogyProximityij) is positive and significant only for the 
collaborations of subsidiaries (MNCs_xijt) and domestic organizations (DCs_xijt): the relative attraction of 
an emerging country for multinationals and highly skilled workers from abroad positively depends upon 
the local scientific and technological infrastructure. This result suggests that multinationals seeking 
profits and searching for technologies abroad prefer, ceteris paribus, countries whose technological 
composition is similar to that of their own country. However, these factors do not play any role in 
decisions at an individual level as the international mobility of highly skilled workers of emerging 
economies is affected by the cultural relationship and dimension of the labor market. 
Dividing collaborations by country of origin we are also able to better understand the nature of 
the overall positive effect of IPRs on the number of international patent collaborations, as shown in the 
previous section (Table 6 and 7). First of all, the number of collaborations originating from 
multinational subsidiaries increases with the strength of the patent regime in the emerging country: the 
coefficient of IPRs is positive and significant both with and without country-pair fixed effects. Stronger 
IPRs, by reducing the imitation risk faced by potential investors in the advanced country and by 
creating a market for technologies in the emerging country, reduce the transaction costs (such as 
informational asymmetry and non-excludability property of knowledge) of collaborations and increase 
the investor’s rent share (e.g. Markusen, 1995).  
 
 
This in turn raises the incentive of MNC subsidiaries to locate part of the innovative process 
abroad and to cooperate with the local knowledge base. This result is in line with Branstetter et al. 
(2006) and corroborates the finding of Lee and Mansfield (1996) who found a positive relationship 
between the level of the IPR system in developing countries as perceived by a sample of 100 US firms 
and their foreign direct investments. Also, the IPR coefficient for the collaborations originating from 
foreign companies abroad (FCs_xij ) is positive and significant in the FE case showing that foreign 
companies located in one of the G7 countries are more inclined to cooperate with inventors from 
emerging countries as the fear of being imitated decreases with the higher level of IPRs. Finally, Table 6 
and 7 suggest that IPRs also positively affect collaborations brought about by individuals (Is_xij). The 
strength of the patent regime in the emerging country seems to encourage cooperation with foreign 
inventors. 
Interestingly, the effect of IPRs is negative for collaborations stemming from the R&D 
laboratories of domestic companies (DCs_xijt): the coefficient of IPRs (columns 3 and 4 in Table 6 and 
column 2 in Table 7) is negative and significant both with and without country-pair fixed effects. So 
IPR reinforcement facilitates international technological collaborations when (with the perspective of 
the emerging countries) foreign companies are directly involved in the R&D project. At the same time, 
it does not facilitate collaborations when the innovative project is owned by a domestic company. So 
access to foreign knowledge in the form of technological collaborations for domestic companies seems 
more difficult when there are stronger IPRs. 
Finally, some other results in Table 4 are also confirmed in Table 6 and 7. The asymmetry of 
the gravity model is evident for all types of patent collaborations. The masses measured by patenting 
activity have a positive and significant effect only in the case of patent applications of emerging 
countries (Patentsit) and not for patent applications of advanced countries (Patentsjt). Moreover, as 
expected, the coefficient is greater for collaborations originating from the R&D laboratories of 
domestic organizations (DCs_xijt). However, the dimension of the emerging country (LaborForceit) has a 
positive effect on the collaborations originating in the emerging country (MNCs_xijt and DCs_xijt) but 
 
 
negative on the foreign collaborations (FCs_xijt): on the one hand, bigger countries are able to attract 
more MNC subsidiaries and highly skilled workers from abroad to cooperate with, and on the other 
hand, for what concerns the FCs_xij collaborations, it makes sense that highly skilled workers have 
more incentives to leave their own country when they find fewer opportunities in terms of 
employment. This reasoning is reinforced by the positive role played by the dimension of the G7 
country (LaborForcejt) which positively affects the international mobility of highly skilled people 
(FCs_xijt). 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
There is a growing body of literature that underlines that face-to-face contacts and personal 
interactions are a crucial vehicle of knowledge transfer and spillovers. In emerging countries, access to 
foreign technologies, in particular, via collaborations with foreign counterparts, both in the domestic 
country and abroad is a hot political issue. As scientific research increasingly involves international 
teams and mobility of researchers is on the rise, it is possible to ask whether collaborative links with 
foreign laboratories rely more on relational and capability proximity than on geographical distance. 
Also, multinationals are increasingly delocalizing R&D activities in host countries, spurring a debate on 
what are the conditions under which the local community of researchers and firms can learn by tapping 
into foreign collaborative networks. 
 Taking these issues as a point of departure, this paper analyzes international technological 
collaborations among inventors in emerging and advanced countries using USPTO patent applications 
and asks to what extent they are affected by a decrease in communication and transport costs (that are a 
function of geographical distance). In addition, it studies the effects of a set of economic and 
institutional variables like technological proximity, sharing a common language or a colonial link, and, 
finally, the recent reinforcement of IPRs brought about by the TRIPs agreement. 
 
 
 This paper uses a novel database that considers not only the residence of inventors and 
assignees but also the companies’ country of origin (in terms of ownership). In addition, the specific 
composition of the international team of inventors and the relative weight of the different countries in 
the team are taken into account. An important point of the paper is that results depend upon the type 
of collaboration considered and it makes a substantial difference whether the collaboration stems from 
a multinational company from an advanced country or a company from an emerging country. 
Overall, geographical distance seems to have a modest effect on international collaborations 
when controlling for trade relationships, technological and cultural distances. However, differences 
arise when we consider the origin and the nature of such collaborations. In particular, we observe that 
distance affects international collaborations only when they originate in laboratories of companies from 
the emerging countries. On the contrary, geographical distance in itself is not important for those 
collaborations originating in MNC subsidiaries or via the international mobility of inventors from an 
emerging to an advanced country. If simple geographical distance has no strong (and negative) impact 
on international collaborations, time zone differences, to some extent, do. 
We also find that technological proximity is an important factor in explaining international 
technological collaborations. Sharing a common language is also always significant in the main models. 
This effect is mainly driven by the collaborations generated by the international mobility of highly 
skilled workers from the emerging countries or from companies from the emerging countries. Sharing a 
common language has no significant impact for collaborations within MNC subsidiaries. 
Our paper contributes also to the policy debate on the effects of IPR reinforcement and our 
evidence suggests that there may be some positive effects on knowledge flows generated by the 
reinforcement of IPRs for those economies which started at the beginning of the 1990s with a low level 
of IPR protection. However, these results have to be taken with extreme care because the impact of the 
IPR regime is extremely complex and can vary from sector to sector and country to country. 
Importantly, we also show that the impact of IPR reinforcement varies according to the type of 
collaboration considered and country of origin (emerging vs. advanced) of the companies involved. For 
 
 
collaborations deriving from laboratories of multinational subsidiaries we have a positive effect of IPR 
reinforcement. On the contrary, for collaborations that involve only a company from the emerging 
market the effect of the reinforcement of IPRs is negative. Finally, our additional results show that a 
positive result may be confined to pairs of countries that are close trade partners and to those countries 
with a lower level of per capita GDP. 
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1 There is substantial evidence that knowledge spillovers tend to be geographically localized (among many papers on this 
issue see for example the following surveys: Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; Keller, 2002 and Keller, 2010).  
2 Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement claims that “The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology”. Moreover, 
Article 66.2 asks developed WTO Members to “provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the 
purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer”. 
 
 
                                                 
3 R&D collaborations in Europe are significantly affected by technological and geographical distance (Balland, 2011; 
Scherngell and Barber, 2009 and 2011). At the same time other factors affect R&D collaborations like the specific position 
of the company in the network of collaborations, past experience in collaborations (Autans-Bernard, 2007 in micro and 
nanotechnologies), being part of the same group (organizational proximity) and, finally, having a similar institutional form 
(institutional proximity) (Balland, 2011 in the Global Navigation Satellite System). 
4 Institutional proximity plays an important role mitigating the effect of geographical distance (Pond et al. 2007).  
5 Kerr (2008) shows that knowledge diffusion is importantly affected by interpersonal links within the same ethnic 
community. 
6 If a patent is signed by three inventors from three different countries in our sample, we consider three bilateral 
collaborations. 
7 Consider an emerging country researcher who has not access to the needed infrastructure to develop the technology. He 
has the option to collaborate either with a G7 lab in the emerging country (if there exists) or with a company abroad. In 
both cases the researcher in the emerging country would benefit from the (technological) competences of the advanced 
country and, at the same time, the G7 country would benefit too from the (scientific) competences of the researcher. 
8 Note that we are assuming that workload and skills are the same across inventors. As shown by Bergek & Bruzelius (2010) 
this is not always the case. 
9 Note that applicants can be companies, universities, public research organizations, governmental institutions or other 
forms of organizations (e.g. foundations, associations etc.) and individuals. Whenever a patent is co-owned by two or more 
companies, one from an emerging and the other from a foreign country, we categorized it as “domestic” in so far as we 
believe that this case reflects a R&D activity located in the emerging country. 
10 This phenomenon would be associated with knowledge flows and possibly categorized as international labor mobility. 
11 Gravity models have been widely used in explaining trade flows (see Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006 and De Benedictis and 
Taglioni, 2011). Disdier and Head (2008) show that the negative impact of distance on trade flows began to rise after the 
1950s and remains high. Taking into account in their meta-analysis of approximately 1400 distance effects estimated in 103 
different econometric papers, they show that the mean bilateral trade flow elasticity to distance is equal to 0.9 and challenge 
significantly the idea that distance is becoming less relevant as globalization and international integration increase. 
12 In Equation 1 we estimated the number of collaborations in year t as function of attributes of the country pairs in the 
same year. However a patent application could be seen as the outcome of R&D activities performed in the years prior to t. 
For this reason we estimated several gravity equations where the correlates are evaluated in the year t-1, t-2 and moving 2-
year average over (t-2) to (t - 1) and we obtained similar results (available upon request). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
13 Data come from the CEPII dataset, further details at http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.htm. The weighted 
measure is the distance between the biggest cities of those two countries, those inter-city distances being weighted by the 
share of the city in the overall country population. 
14 Bilateral imports are both expressed in millions of US dollars at current prices; however the inclusion of a full set of time 
dummies makes it unnecessary to use constant prices (Picci, 2010). 
15 Official data (OECD) on bilateral FDIs have many missing observations. Nonetheless, we have controlled our results also 
using bilateral FDI data. Results do not change. 
16 TRIPS agreements require WTO member nations to enact and enforce laws on copyrights, trademarks and patents to 
protect intellectual property. Rights expanded in many fields such as computer software, publications of various types, and 
pharmaceuticals. 
17 Helpman (1993) underlines the risk that a tighter IPR in developing countries could provoke a reduction of FDI and an 
increase of imports which in turn would have deterred innovation because of monopoly pricing and a higher dependence on 
imports. 
18 This is the most widely used IPR index. Legislation-based indexes have some limitations that are discussed in the literature 
(e.g. Hamdan-Livramento, 2009). The main limitation is that it does not take into account how in practice IPRs legislation is 
enforced. 
19 Data are available for an average of 1960-1990, from 1995, 2000 and 2005. Following Picci (2010), for the years 1990, 
1991 and 1992, the 1960-1990 average has been used. The years 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1997 are set equal to the observation 
for 1995. The observation for the year 2000 is also used for the years 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002. Lastly, the observation for 
the year 2005 is also used for the years 2003 and 2004. 
20 An index created by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) that is designed to measure equity market performance 
in global emerging markets.  
21 A patent application is a legal document filed with the USPTO when applying for patent protection, which includes an 
abstract, a specification (claims), an oath or declaration, and usually at least one drawing. Other available information in the 
patent applications are the names and country of inventors, name and country of assignees, filing date, references to the 
prior knowledge, and technological classes.   
22 An example of collaborative patent between USA and Brazil is the following: http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-
adv.htm&r=4&f=G&l=50&d=PTXT&S1=4950848&OS=4950848&RS=4950848 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
23 We used data developed in Malerba et al. (2011) which categorized by ownership the assignees for Brazil, Russian 
Federation, India, China, Mexico and South Africa. Here we updated the data to Singapore, Turkey, Argentina, but we have 
been not able to accurately categorize all collaborations for Korea and Israel. 
24 In their simulation study designed to assess the performance of different econometric methods, they find that PPML 
estimators are less subjected to have biases form heteroschedasticity. 
25 Throughout the paper we consider all patenting collaborations to be of similar value. However, it is plausible that 
attractors and frictions may have different impacts according to the value of the collaborations. Given the typical skewed 
distribution in the technological and economic value of the inventions, we weight them using standard value indicators like 
forward patent citations and in such case our measure of collaborations becomes a weighted sum of patent collaborations by 
pairs and year, where the weights are the number of citations received in the first three years after the priority date. The 
results are not reported to save space but are available upon requests and are very similar to the results displayed in Table 4: 
the only difference is that differences in time zones have no negative effect on the international patenting collaborations. 
This could suggest that as far as two countries are able to produce a novel and worthwhile innovation, the effects of 
transportation and communication costs are negligible. 
26 We estimate a gravity model to the extent that there is no overlap between home countries (i) and source countries (j) 
which represent two distinct sets of countries in terms of economic and patenting activity. 
27 Interestingly, past colonial relationship (COLONY ij) remains not significant even without controlling for language 
similarity (LANGUAGE ij). 
28 Note that technology proximity could hide other factors like the similarities in the demand side and in the stage of 
development. 
29 We mainly lack bilateral information for Canada (and also for Italy and Japan): the number of observations falls to 
929 and the FDI bilateral estimate is positive but not significant. The results for the other variables are confirmed and are 
available upon request. 
30 FE models clearly cancel out the time-constant variables like geographical distance. Notice also that the technological 
proximity (TechnlogyProximityij) is no more significant: the reason is the variance of this index is high between countries but 
very low within pairs of countries.  
31 Branstetter et al. (2002) found a similar effect of IPR reforms on international technology transfer measured by royalty 
payments between affiliates. 
32 This suggests two other possible interpretations of this phenomenon: (1) by developing their economies, emergent 
countries build up competences which allow them to create new knowledge without the help of more advanced countries; 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(2) for high levels of development, with stronger IPRs, multinational companies might prefer licensing and exporting their 
technological goods rather than collaborating with domestic laboratories. 
33 Even if some results are still mixed, the available empirical evidence tends to suggest that trade responds to IPRs 
reinforcement even if there are some contrasting results (e.g. Maskus and Penubarti, 1995 and Co, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
  
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table A1 . Definition and summary statistics  
Variable Definition and Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Collaborative patents ijt 
Number of patents with at least an inventor 
from the Emerging Country and an inventor 
from the Advanced Country (source: 
KITES/USPTO) 1155 12.71 40.81 0 508 
Subsidiaries collaborative patents ijt 
Number of patents with at least an inventor 
from the Emerging Country and an inventor 
from the Advanced Country applied by G7 
subsidiaries (source: KITES/USPTO) 945 3.03 11.73 0 170 
Domestic companies collaborative patents ijt 
Number of patents with at least an inventor 
from the Emerging Country and an inventor 
from the Advanced Country applied by domestic 
(i) companies (source: KITES/USPTO) 945 0.63 1.88 0 18 
Foreign companies collaborative patents ijt 
Number of patents with at least an inventor 
from the Emerging Country and an inventor 
from the Advanced Country applied by foreign 
(j) companies (source: KITES/USPTO) 945 4.52 14.82 0 183 
Individuals collaborative patent ijt 
Number of patents with at least an inventor 
from the Emerging Country and an inventor 
from the Advanced Country applied by 
individuals (source: KITES/USPTO) 945 0.37 1.20 0 15 
Distance  ij 
Km (in logarithm), simple distance which uses 
latitudes and longitudes of the most important 
cities/agglomerations (in terms of population). 
Source: CEPII dataset 1155 8.96 0.58 7.06 9.83 
Distance (capital)  ij 
Km (in logarithm), simple distance which uses 
latitudes and longitudes of the capitals. Source: 
CEPII dataset 1155 8.95 0.56 7.06 9.82 
Distance (weighted) ij 
Km (in logarithm), distance between the biggest 
cities of those two countries, those inter-city 
distances being weighted by the share of the city 
in the overall country’s population. Source: 
CEPII dataset  1155 8.97 0.58 6.86 9.81 
Time Zone  ij 
Time Zone difference among countries capital 
cities 1155 5.52 3.39 0 12 
Labor force it Total (in logarithm), Source: World Bank 1155 17.05 1.76 14.26 20.46 
Labor force jt Total (in logarithm), Source: World Bank 1155 17.44 0.68 16.50 18.83 
Patents it 
Number of patent applications  (in logarithm) 
with at least an inventor residing in country i 
(source: KITES/USPTO) 1155 5.18 1.63 0.69 9.60 
Patents jt 
Number of patent applications  (in 
logarithm)with at least an inventor residing in 
country j (source: KITES/USPTO) 1155 9.12 1.29 7.15 11.80 
Trade ijt 
Bilateral imports, millions of US dollars, current 
prices (in logarithm). Stan database 1155 7.55 1.26 1.79 11.62 
FDI it 
Millions of constant US dollars (inward), year 
2000 prices (in logarithm) 1155 8.09 1.67 0.00 11.01 
IPR it 
Ginarte and Park Index  (in logarithm) (Ginarte 
and Park, 1997; Park 2008) [see Table 1] 1155 1.02 0.42 0.03 1.45 
Technology Proximity ijt Indicator of pairwise "inventive proximity" 1155 0.69 0.14 0.10 0.96 
Colony ij 
Dummy which equals to one if the two countries 
have ever had a colonial link. Source: CEPII 
dataset 1155 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Language  ij 
Dummy which equals to one if two countries 
share a common official language. Source: 
CEPII dataset 1155 0.16 0.36 0 1 
GDP _ Per capita it 
Millions of constant US dollars (2000) over labor 
force (in logarithm) 1155 0.16 0.36 0 1 
 
  
 
 
Table A2 . Correlations  
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 
Collaborative patents ijt [1] 1                                      
Subsidiaries collaborative patents ijt [2] 0.98* 1                                    
Domestic companies collaborative patents ijt [3] 0.67* 0.64* 1                                  
Foreign companies collaborative patents ijt [4] 0.98* 0.96* 0.69* 1                                
Individuals collaborative patent ijt [5] 0.66* 0.65* 0.71* 0.69* 1                              
Distance  ij [6] 0.06* 0.07* 0.08* 0.07* 0.03 1                            
Distance (capital)  ij [7] 0.07* 0.07* 0.08* 0.07* 0.03 0.99* 1                          
Distance (weighted) ij [8] 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.03 0.99* 0.99* 1                        
Time Zone  ij [9] 0.18* 0.19* 0.16* 0.20* 0.16* 0.71* 0.73* 0.72* 1                      
Labour force it [10] 0.03 0.14* 0.05 0.17* 0.21* -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.07* 1                    
Labour force jt [11] 0.46* 0.40* 0.44* 0.44* 0.42* 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.10* 0.00 1                  
Patents it [12] 0.30* 0.30* 0.27* 0.31* 0.23* -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.14* -0.03 0.02 1                
Patents jt [13] 0.46* 0.39* 0.43* 0.43* 0.40* 0.08* 0.08* 0.06* 0.15* 0.01 0.93* 0.10* 1              
Trade ijt [14] 0.21* 0.13* 0.14* 0.14* 0.17* -0.15* -0.17* -0.16* -0.20* 0.15* -0.02 0.36* 0.01 1            
FDI it [15] 0.36* 0.33* 0.36* 0.37* 0.35* -0.33* -0.34* -0.36* -0.13* 0.13* 0.68* 0.25* 0.63* 0.23* 1          
IPR it [16] 0.11* 0.14* 0.11* 0.17* 0.14* 0.10* 0.10* 0.08* 0.19* 0.26* 0.01 0.19* 0.10* 0.17* 0.28* 1        
Technology Proximity ijt [17] 0.15* 0.10* 0.12* 0.10* 0.06 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.37* 0.02 0.51* 0.15* 0.23* 0.16* 0.18* 1      
COLONY  ij [18] -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.17* -0.17* -0.18* -0.12* -0.11* -0.05 0.11* -0.08* 0.15* 0.10* -0.10* 0.04 1    
Language  ij [19] 0.25* 0.19* 0.30* 0.20* 0.17* 0.19* 0.20* 0.22* 0.22* -0.18* 0.04 0.14* 0.07* 0.16* -0.11* -0.200* 0.04 0.41* 1  
GDP_per capita it [20] 0.02 -0.12* -0.03 -0.13* -0.18* -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08* -0.90* 0.00 0.21* 0.02 -0.08* -0.03 -0.09* 0.49* 0.05 0.06 
 
 
 
Table 1.  
Collaborations by patent applicants’ ownership and assignee’s address. 
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Collaboration is defined as a patent with inventors residing both in emerging and advanced country. 
In the terminology we take the perspective of the emerging country. We consider four types of 
collaborations. A domestic collaboration (DC) is when the assignee is a domestic institution (firm, 
university or public research center) which is located in the emerging country; a subsidiary 
collaboration (MNC) is when the patent is applied for by a G7 MNC subsidiary located in the 
emerging country; a foreign collaboration (FC) is when the patent applicant country of origin is from 
one of the G7 countries and is not located in the emerging country; finally I is when the patent is 
applied for by individuals residing either in emerging country or in G7 country, or both. Whenever a 
patent is co-applied for by two or more companies, we adopted the following rule: whenever there is a 
DC we categorized it only as DC. Then, in the case of multiple co-applications between MNC,FC and 
I we categorized it as MNC. The residual category is I. 
 
 
Table 2.  
Patent and IPR summary statistics 
Country Patent data IPR data* 
  (a) (b)   (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
  
Total patent 
applications 
Collaborative 
patent 
applications (%) 
Labour Force* 
(Millions) 
Patent 
productivity 
(a)/(c) 
Average 
1960–1990 1995 2000 2005 
Argentina 928 237 26% 15.03 61.74 1.6 2.73 3.98 3.98 
Brazil 2345 754 32% 75.61 31.01 1.22 1.48 3.59 3.59 
China 9427 2464 26% 712.37 13.23 1.33 2.12 3.09 4.08 
India 6264 2229 36% 371.28 16.87 1.03 1.23 2.27 3.76 
Israel 18447 3432 19% 2.22 8309.46 2.76 3.14 4.13 4.13 
Korea 70467 2303 3% 21.75 3239.86 2.55 3.89 4.13 4.33 
Malaysia 1332 444 33% 8.82 151.02 1.7 2.7 3.03 3.48 
Mexico 1613 568 35% 36.57 44.11 1.19 3.14 3.68 3.88 
Singapore 5740 1631 28% 1.90 3021.05 1.64 3.88 4.01 4.21 
South Africa 2354 371 16% 14.28 164.85 2.94 3.39 4.25 4.25 
Turkey 392 251 64% 2.76 142.03 1.16 2.65 4.01 4.01 
All sample 119309 14684 12% 116.60 1023.23 (s.d.: 0.69) (s.d.: 0.87) (s.d.: 0.62) (s.d.: 0.27) 
* Ginarte and Park index: is Park (2008); ** average values: 1990-2000 
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Table 3.  
Patent collaborations frequency by applicant type. 
  DCs_xijt MNCs_xijt FCs_xijt Is_xijt 
Argentina 2% 26% 64% 8% 
Brazil 5% 9% 82% 4% 
China 3% 16% 74% 7% 
India 3% 17% 77% 3% 
Malaysia 2% 44% 52% 2% 
Mexico 4% 22% 66% 8% 
Singapore 20% 32% 45% 2% 
South Africa 15% 6% 62% 16% 
Turkey 3% 21% 72% 4% 
Collaboration is defined as a patent with inventors residing both in emerging and advanced country. 
In the terminology we take the perspective of the emerging country. We consider four types of 
collaborations. A domestic collaboration (DC) is when the assignee is a domestic institution (firm, 
university or public research center) which is located in the emerging country; a subsidiary 
collaboration (MNC) is when the patent is applied for by a G7 MNC subsidiary located in the 
emerging country; a foreign collaboration (FC) is when the patent applicant country of origin is from 
one of the G7 countries and is not located in the emerging country; finally I is when the patent is 
applied for by individuals residing either in emerging country or in G7 country, or both. Whenever a 
patent is co-applied for by two or more companies, we adopted the following rule: whenever there is a 
DC we categorized it only as DC. Then, in the case of multiple co-applications between MNC,FC and 
I we categorized it as MNC. The residual category is I. 
. 
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Table 4.  
The Role of the Distance. Poisson estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Collaborative 
patents 
Collaborative 
patents 
Collaborative 
patents 
Collaborative 
patents 
Collaborative 
patents 
Collaborative 
patents 
Estimation method PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML 
        
Distance ij -0.54*** -0.24    0.25 
  (0.15) (0.16)    (0.36) 
Distance (capital) ij   -0.21    
    (0.16)    
Distance (weighted) ij    -0.24   
     (0.15)   
Time zone difference ij     -0.073*** -0.11* 
      (0.027) (0.062) 
Labor Force it -1.48* -0.80 -0.78 -0.79 -0.96 -1.03 
  (0.82) (0.89) (0.89) (0.90) (0.89) (0.88) 
Labor Force jt 0.71 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.30 1.37 
  (1.33) (1.60) (1.60) (1.61) (1.62) (1.63) 
Patents it 0.72*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 
  (0.061) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) 
Patents jt 0.60 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.30 0.31 
  (0.45) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42) (0.43) 
Technology Proximity ijt  1.48*** 1.50*** 1.51*** 1.33*** 1.25*** 
   (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.47) 
Trade ijt  0.13 0.14 0.12 0.032 0.020 
   (0.095) (0.097) (0.096) (0.097) (0.098) 
FDI it  -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.016 -0.017 
   (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) 
IPR it  0.10 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.15 
   (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Colony ij  0.19 0.20 0.16 0.27 0.41 
   (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.18) (0.29) 
Language ij  0.40** 0.41** 0.42** 0.49*** 0.52*** 
   (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) 
Constant 8.34 -9.10 -9.40 -8.90 -13.2 -15.3 
  (27.8) (31.4) (31.4) (31.3) (31.6) (32.1) 
        
Observations 1155 1155 1155 1155 1155 1155 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country i dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country j dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log pseudo-likelihood -2924.46 -2742.96 -2745.72 -2740.56 -2720.63 -2715.63 
All explanatory variables except Technology proximity and Time zone difference, are in logs. Country i is the home 
(emerging) country, country j is the foreign (G7) country. Country-pair clustered robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 5.  
The role of IPR. Poisson Fixed effect estimations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
All countries Low IPR countries High IPR countries All countries 
Dependent variable Collaborative patents Collaborative patents Collaborative patents Collaborative patents 
Estimation method POISSON FE POISSON FE POISSON FE POISSON FE 
      
Labor Force it -1.83*** -0.52 -2.03*** -1.75*** 
  (0.37) (0.99) (0.47) (0.38) 
Labor Force jt 0.042 3.45*** -1.75** -0.11 
  (0.56) (0.93) (0.72) (0.57) 
Patents it 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.59*** 0.66*** 
  (0.035) (0.064) (0.060) (0.04) 
Patents jt 0.65*** 0.38 0.94*** 0.70*** 
  (0.21) (0.34) (0.27) (0.21) 
Technology Proximity ijt -0.061 0.16 -0.37 -0.06 
  (0.19) (0.27) (0.30) (0.19) 
Trade ijt -0.082* 0.27*** -0.28*** -0.22*** 
  (0.049) (0.088) (0.055) (0.08) 
FDI it -0.017 0.019 -0.046* -0.02 
  (0.019) (0.049) (0.024) (0.02) 
IPR it 0.30*** 0.22* -0.38** -1.09*** 
  (0.066) (0.13) (0.18) (0.39) 
IPR it *Trade ijt    0.07* 
     (0.04) 
IPR it *GDP_per capita it    -0.06*** 
     (0.01) 
      
Observations 1155 525 630 1155 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log pseudo-likelihood -2044.54 -872.92 -1122.90 -2035.01 
All explanatory variables except Technology proximity and Time zone difference, are in logs. Country i is the home (emerging) 
country, country j is the foreign (G7) country. High IPR countries are those which show an IPR index higher than 1.50 in 
1990; they are: South Africa, South Korea, Malaysia, Israel, Singapore, and Argentina. Countries with an IPR index lower 
than 1.50 are: Brazil, India, China, Mexico and Turkey. Country-pair clustered robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 6.  
Collaborations by patent applicants’ ownership. Poisson estimates 
 Subsidiaries MNCs_xijt 
Domestic 
DCs_xijt 
Foreign 
FCs_xijt 
Individuals 
INDIVIDUALSs_xijt 
 PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML 
 (1) (2) § (3) (4) §§ (5) (6) §§§ (7) (8) §§§§ 
         
Distance ij -0.31 0.19 -0.64* 1.35 -0.15 0.69 -0.44 1.44 
 (0.27) (0.49) (0.38) (0.84) (0.16) (0.45) (0.29) (0.88) 
Time zone 
difference ij  -0.087  -0.39**  -0.15**  -0.32** 
  (0.083)  (0.17)  (0.074)  (0.13) 
Labor Force it 3.46** 3.28** 12.8*** 11.9*** -2.38** -2.52** -1.25 -1.43 
 (1.64) (1.62) (2.95) (2.80) (1.10) (1.08) (2.72) (2.77) 
Labor Force jt 0.54 0.51 8.99* 8.27** 5.70*** 5.68*** 4.55 3.88 
 (4.36) (4.39) (4.74) (3.92) (1.76) (1.82) (3.32) (3.20) 
Patents it 0.79*** 0.78*** 1.55*** 1.53*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.45** 0.46** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.20) (0.21) (0.085) (0.085) (0.21) (0.21) 
Patents jt -0.47 -0.44 0.96 0.85 -0.16 -0.15 -0.34 -0.31 
 (0.91) (0.92) (1.08) (1.06) (0.57) (0.57) (1.50) (1.51) 
Tech. Prox. ijt 1.46* 1.19 2.39** 1.45 0.68 0.46 -0.54 -0.81 
 (0.81) (0.75) (1.05) (1.04) (0.64) (0.58) (1.05) (1.01) 
Trade ijt 0.068 0.050 0.15 -0.0010 0.20** 0.16* 0.32 0.23 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.29) (0.27) (0.090) (0.094) (0.20) (0.19) 
FDI it -0.040 -0.043 0.037 0.053 0.021 0.019 -0.13 -0.13 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.097) (0.084) (0.047) (0.046) (0.089) (0.087) 
IPR it 0.45** 0.48** -1.11*** -1.01*** 0.19 0.20 1.02** 1.04*** 
 (0.22) (0.20) (0.34) (0.33) (0.19) (0.19) (0.40) (0.40) 
Colony ij 0.69** 0.69* 0.55 0.45 -0.17 -0.16 1.29** 1.09* 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.66) (0.59) (0.54) (0.54) (0.61) (0.63) 
Language ij -0.15 -0.027 1.23*** 1.98*** 0.51** 0.73*** 0.69 1.23*** 
 (0.28) (0.30) (0.34) (0.52) (0.22) (0.23) (0.43) (0.46) 
Constant -66.4 -67.2 -371*** -359*** -59.3* -63.7* -54.2 -55.9 
 (76.6) (78.4) (76.9) (74.3) (31.6) (33.5) (75.3) (74.6) 
         
Observations § 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 945 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country i 
dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country j 
dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log pseudo-
likelihood -908.58 -908.56 -479.62 -479.58 -1616.65 -1616.54 -447.12 -447.11 
All explanatory variables except Technology proximity and Time zone difference, are in logs. Country i is the home (emerging) 
country, country j is the foreign (G7) country. In this sample South Korea and Israel are not considered. Country-pair 
clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 7.  
Collaborations by patent applicants’ ownership. FE Poisson estimates 
 
Subsidiaries 
MNCs_xijt 
Domestic 
DCs_xijt 
Foreign 
FCs_xijt 
Individuals 
INDIVIDUALSs_xijt 
 
Poisson  
FE 
Poisson  
FE 
Poisson  
FE 
Poisson  
FE 
 (1) § (2) §§ (3) §§§ (4) §§§§ 
     
Labor Force it 2.80** 12.0*** -2.84*** -1.60 
 (1.27) (2.69) (0.77) (2.79) 
Labor Force jt -1.74 4.76 3.37*** 1.38 
 (1.76) (3.30) (0.96) (3.56) 
Patents it 0.67*** 1.53*** 0.65*** 0.47** 
 (0.096) (0.19) (0.053) (0.19) 
Patents jt 0.14 1.22 0.19 -0.16 
 (0.66) (1.15) (0.35) (1.30) 
Tech. Prox. ijt -0.68 0.46 -0.19 -0.053 
 (0.50) (1.07) (0.28) (1.02) 
Trade ijt 0.30* -0.40*** 0.072 0.048 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.080) (0.19) 
FDI it -0.083 0.16 0.013 -0.11 
 (0.057) (0.10) (0.030) (0.079) 
IPR it 0.59*** -0.91*** 0.27*** 1.01** 
 (0.20) (0.35) (0.10) (0.42) 
     
Observations  795 570 915 510 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pairs dummy (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log pseudo-likelihood -691.77 -350.14 -1253.20 -339.37 
All explanatory variables except Tech. Prox ijt are in logs. Country i is the home (emerging) country, country j is 
the foreign (G7) country. In this sample South Korea and Israel are not considered. §:10 groups (150 obs.) 
dropped because of all zero outcomes; §§: 25 groups (375 obs.) dropped because of all zero outcomes; §§§: 2 
groups (30 obs.) dropped because of all zero outcomes; §§§§: 29 groups (435 obs.) dropped because of all zero 
outcomes. Country-pair clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  
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